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Misstatements' in Applications for Life and Health
and Accident Insurance Under the
Louisiana Insurance Code
Since the likelihood of illness or untimely death varies with
the individual, applicants for life or health and accident insur-
ance present risks of varying magnitude to the insurer. To con-
duct a successful business, insurance underwriters must deter-
mine which risks to reject and set adequate premiums for the
risks assumed. Consequently, insurance companies strive to
acquire sufficient information pertaining to each applicant to
enable a skillful estimation of each risk proffered. One source
of information available to insurers consists of the statements
made by prospective policyholders in answer to questions con-
tained in applications for insurance. This Comment presents an
analysis and evaluation of the Louisiana law governing the ef-
fect of inaccuracies in such statements in applications for life or
health and accident policies.
The General Law Unaltered By Legislation
Statements made by the insured as inducement for the in-
surer to issue the policy are called representations. 2 If the in-
surance contract is entered, the insurer is entitled to rely upon
these statements as a description of the risk assumed, although
they are not considered to be part of the contract.3 Thus, if one
of these statements is materially incorrect, the insurer may avoid
the policy since the risk actually presented by the insured is not
the same risk that is covered by the policy.4 However, to be
material the statement must have been of the nature that, had
it been correct, the insurer either would not have contracted or
would not have agreed upon the same terms. 5 The question of
1. In order to avoid confusion the customary term "misrepresentation" has
not been used in this Comment. This term has not been employed with any
consistency by the courts or legal writers. It has been used to denote both inteni-
tionally and unintentionally incorrect statements; both false warranties and
inaccurate representations; and all of these types of misstatements collectively.
2. 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE 390 (1941) ; PATTERSON, INSURANCE 332 (1935) ;
VANCE, INSURANCE 386 (3d ed. 1951) ; Harnett, Misrepresentations in Life In-
surance Applications, 17 KAN. B.A.J. 214 (1948) ; Patterson, Misrepresentation
by Insured Under New York Insurance Law, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 241 (1944);
Note, 8 Mo. L. REV. 137 (1943).
3. VANCE, INSURANCE 387 (3d ed. 1951).
4. 1 APPI,EMAN, INSURANCE 394 (1941) ; PATTERSON, INSURANCE 333 (1935)
VANCE, INSURANCE 386 (3d ed. 1951). Of. PROSSER, TORTS § 532 (1955) ; WIL-
LISTON, CONTRACTS 4189, § 1500 (1937) ; Note, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 78 (1923).
5. 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE 398 (1941) ; PATTERSON, INSURANCE 336 (1935) ;
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whether or not the insured had knowledge of the inaccuracy is
irrelevant where his statement constitutes a representation of
fact.6 But where the statement is a representation of opinion
only, no power to avoid arises if the statement correctly repre-
sents the insured's opinion, despite any inconsistency with con-
crete fact.7 This may be justified on the notion that the insurer
cannot expect to rely on an applicant's opinion as descriptive of
the actual risk assumed, but merely as an indication of what the
risk might be.
The representation is to be distinguished from the warranty,
which is a term of the insurance contract designed to delimit
precisely the risk assumed." The warranty requires the existence
of a stipulated circumstance as a condition to recovery under the
policy and gives the insurer the power to rescind the contract
if the condition is not fulfilledY Thus, if it is warranted that
the insured has undergone a physical examination within the
preceding year, coverage will be restricted to a person benefitted
by such an examination. 10 The insurer's power to avoid the con-
tract for breach of warranty does not depend upon the material-
VANCE, INSURANCE 386 (3d ed. 1951); Notes, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 78 (1923),
25 MICH. L. REV. 550 (1926), 7 N.Y.L.F. 225 (1961).
6. 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE 425 (1941) ; PATTERSON, INSURANCE 336 (193-5)
VANCE, INSURANCE 389 (3d ed. 1951) ; Harnett, Insurance, in PROCEEDINGS OF
A.B.A. 130 (1959); Notes, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 78 (1923); 25 MICH. L. REV.
806 (1925), 8 Mo. L. REV. 137 (1948). Of. Harnett, The Doctrine of Conceal-
ment, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 391 (1950); Patterson, Misrepresentation by
Insured Under the New York Insurance Law, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 241 (1944) ;
Comment, Intent to Deceive in Applications for Insurance Policies, 10 WASH. L.
REV. 78 (1935).
7. World Ins. Co. v. Pipes, 255 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Davidson v. Massa-
chusetts Casualty Co., 325 Mass. 115, 89 N.E.2d 201 (1949) ; Mutual Benefit
Health & Accident Assn. v. Milder, 152 Neb. 519, 41 N.W.2d 780 (1950) ; Evans
v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 322 Pa. 547, 186 AtI. 133 (1936) ; 1 APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE 419 (1941). See PATTERSON, INSURANCE 343 (1935); VANCE, IN-
SURANCE 394 (3d ed. 1951).
8. 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE 440 (1941); PATTERSON, INSURANCE 236, 244
(1935) ;VANCE, INSURANCE, 366, 408 (3d ed. 1951) ; Patterson, Warranties in
Insurance Law, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 595 (1934).
9. Jeffries v. Economical Life Ins. Co., 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 47 (1875) ; Barker
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 198 Mass. 375, 84 N.E. 490 (1908) ; Shamblen v.
Modern Woodmen, 105 W. Va. 252, 142 S.E. 447 (1928) ; 1 APPLEMAN, INSUR-
ANCE 440 (1941) ; PATTERSON, INSURANCE 239 (1935) ; VANCE, INSURANCE 408
(3d ed. 1951). Cf. Harnett, The Doctrine of Concealment, 15 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 391 (1950).
10. Warranties are affirmative or promissory according to whether they are
made concerning the existing fact or relate to the existence of circumstances in
the future. This warranty would have been a promissory warranty had the
insured warranted to undego physical examinations in the future. The un-
truth of an affirmative warranty renders the policy voidable from its inception.
A promissory warranty renders the policy voidable from the time of its breach.
VANCE, INSURANCE 410 (3d ed. 1951).
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ity of the circumstance warranted; breach of any warranty gives
the insurer the right to rescind.1
The warranty was conceived during the infancy of the insur-
ance business which was then concerned primarily with the cov-
erage of marine risks. This severe method of controlling risks
was deemed necessary because of the general inaccessibility of
the objects insured and the lack of expertness on the part of
underwriters. 12 Unfortunately, the concept was retained even
after the insurance industry had gained in matureness and the
underwriting of non-marine risks had become commonplace.' s
The unscrupulous among insurers seized upon the warranty as
a device for avoiding contracts with unwary policyholders by
including in each policy a number of obscure and easily infracted
warranties. 4 Despite a vigorous reaction against this practice,
the courts were unable to avert frequent inequitable results in
litigation involving warranties. 15 As a consequence, most states
enacted statutes designed to counteract the harsh effects of the
warranty provision in insurance contracts. Many of these stat-
utes sought to accomplish this result by providing that in the
absence of fraud the false warranty will have the same effect as
an inaccurate representation.' 1
The Louisiana Law Prior To Adoption of the Insurance Code
There appears to be no argument with the proposition that
in absence of legislation the law of insurance which prevails in
11. See note 9 supra.
12. Vance, The History of Development of Warranty in Insurance Law, 20
YALE L.J. 523 (1911).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.; Note, 6 Mo. L. REV. 338 (1941). See, e.g., the classic denunciation
of Justice Doe of New Hampshire in DeLancey v. Rockingham Farmers Mutual
Fire Ins. Co., 52 N.H. 581, 587 (1873): "The principal act of precaution was,
to guard the company against liability for losses. Forms . . . of a most com-
plicated and elaborate structure, were prepared, and filled with covenants, excep-
tions, stipulations, provisos, rules, regulations and conditions, rendering the policy
void in a great number of contingencies.-The compound, . . . would, unless he
were an extraordinary man, be an inexplicable riddle, a mere flood of darkness
and confusion. Some of the most material stipulations were concealed in a mass
of rubbish.-Seldom has the art of typography been so successfully diverted from
the diffusion of knowledge to the suppression of it."
15. Patterson, Warranties in Insurance Law, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 595 (1934);
Notes, 25 MIcH. L. REV. 550 (1926), 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 379 (1934).
16. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 56-908 (1933) ; Ky. R.S. § 296.160 (1943) ; MiNN.
STAT. ANN. § 60.85 (1945) ; N.Y. INS. LAW § 150 (1949) ; VA. CODE § 38
(1950). See Kimball, Warranties, Representations, and Concealment in Utah
Insurance Law, 4 UTAH L. REV. 456 (1955) ; Notes, 10 FoRDHAM L. REV. 276
(1941), 24 HARv. L. REV. 571 (1911), 36 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1938), 10 ST.
Louis L. REV. 112 (1924), 7 Wis. L. REV. 261 (1932).
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the United States will be applied in Louisiana. 17 Prior to 1906
this state had no legislation dealing with misstatements in ap-
plications for life and health and accident insurance. In that
year the legislature enacted the Entire Contract Policy Statute. 18
As amended, 9 this act required that applications for life or
health and accident insurance be attached to the policies when
issued in order to be admissible in evidence; more important to
this discussion, the statute also provided that all statements in
the applications should "in the absence of fraud be deemed rep-
resentations and not warranties. ' 20 This language is susceptible
of two plausible interpretations. It could be read to mean that,
regardless of the intention of the parties in contracting, all
fraudulent statements constitute false warranties, which render
the contract voidable even though immaterial, and all non-fraud-
ulent statements amount to representations, which must be
proven inaccurate and material to avoid the contract.21 On the
other hand, it may mean that whether or not the statement is a
warranty or representation still depends upon the intention of
the parties, but, even though a fraudulent warranty will give
rise to a power to rescind the contract as traditionally was held,
a false non-fraudulent warranty will now be treated as a repre-
sentation; and the representation need only be proven to have
been incorrect and material to avoid the policy.22
Although there is language in several Louisiana Supreme
Court decisions suggesting that the former interpretation had
been adopted,23 it would seem that the results of the cases are
17. See Barry v. Louisiana Insurance Co., 12 Mart. (O.S.) 493 (La. 1822) ;
SAUNDERS, REvISED CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA xviii (1909) ; Nabors, Civil Law
Influences Upon Law of Insurance in Louisiana, 6 TuL. L. REV. 515 (1932);
Comment, 4 TuL. L. REV. 267 (1930). But see Brown v. Duplantier, 1 Mart.(N.S.) 312 (La. 1823) (general principles of Civil Code not necessarily inappli-
cable to commercial transactions).
18. La. Acts 1906, No. 52.
19. La. Acts 1916, No. 227.
20. Ibid.; see Comment, The Entire Contract Policy Statute, 16 TuI. L. REV.
270 (1942).
21. There appears to be no reason to believe that such was the intention of
the legislature. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957
Term-Insurance, 18 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 73, 74 (1957).
22. VANCE, INSURANCE 417 (3d ed. 1951).
23. Roche v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 La. 168, 172, 94 So.2d 20, 21
(1957): "A purpose of this [Act 52 of 1906] and enactments of other states
containing similar provisions was to abolish the highly technical doctrine of
warranty, the intent of the legislators being to transform a warranty into a
representation, thus saving a policy of insurance from forfeiture for false state-
ments contained therein unless they are found to be material or fraudulent,"
citing VANCE, INSURANCE 417 (3d ed. 1951).
Carroll v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 168 La. 953, 955, 123 So. 638, 639 (1929):
"Answers to questions . . . are, in absence of fraud, deemed representations and
1961]
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more consistent with the latter view. There appears to be no
case holding for the insurer on the basis of a fraudulent but im-
material misstatement in an application of insurance. In all
cases in which the insurer was allowed to avoid the policy for an
inaccurate representation, the statement was material.2 4  In-
surers have been consistently unsuccessful in asserting a defense
based upon the applicant's misstatement where the statement
was either immaterial25 or correct.26
not warranties. Act. 227 of 1916 amending and reenacting 52 of 1906.-A false
statement in that respect will not vitiate a policy, unless the false statement is
fraudulent or material." See note 37 infra.
24. Roche v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 La. 168, 94 So.2d 20 (1957)
(insured incorrectly represented that he had not been treated for tuberculosis) ;
Lee v. New York Life Ins. Co., 144 La. 445, 80 So. 652 (1919) (insured denied
having consulted doctor when he in fact had undergone medical examinations
involving extensive urinalyses) ; Flint v. Prudential Ins. Co., 70 So.2d 161 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1954) (misstatements concealing hardening of arteries) ; Fisette
v. The Mutual Life Ins. Co., 4 La. App. 430 (1st Cir. 1926) (representation of
no illness since childhood, but, in fact, doctor had informed insured that he would
die within the year) ; Vaughn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 3 La. App. 614 (1st
Cir. 1925) (misstatements concealing tuberculosis) ; Rhodes v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 172 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1949) (inaccurate representation of no diabetes
or sugar in blood) ; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Stevenson, 70 F.2d 72
(5th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 585 (1934) (applicant inaccurately repre-
sented that he did not have tuberculosis) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart,
69 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1934) (insured represented that he had had no operation
or stomach trouble; in fact he had had testicle removed and had cancer of the
stomach) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson Veneer Co., 86 F. Supp. 863(E.D. La. 1.949) (inaccurate representation that insured had never raised or
spat blood) ; Warren v. New York Life Ins. Co., 37 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. La.
1941) (student pilot represented that he had never flown and did not contem-
plate participation in aeronautics).
25. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rachal, 184 La. 430, 166 So. 129 (1936) (non-
disclosure of consultmtio, of physician for arthritis) ; Carroll v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 168 La. 953, 123 So. 638 (1929) (nondisclosure of consultation for indiges-
tion) ; Cunninglainm v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 La. 1023, 95 So. 110 (1923)
(nondisclosure of non-gonorrheal prostatitis) ; Goff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 131
La. 98, 59 So. 28 (1912) (nondisclosure of passing attack of malaria) ; Cole v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 129 La. 704, 56 So. 645 (1911) (nondisclosure of con-
sultation for sore throat).
26. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rachal, 184 La. 430, 166 So. 129 (1936) (insured
mistook his arthritis for lumbago but correctly represented his opinion of his
health) ; Valesi v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 151 La. 405, 91 So. 818 (1922) (insured's
statement that the most he ever drank at one time was "one or two" drinks was
substantially correct) ; Sandifer v. Louisiana Life Ins. Co., 64 So.2d 488 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1953) (insured was unaware of his heart disease) ; State Life Ins.
Co. v. Cumpton, 144 So. 769 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932) (insured was unaware of
his tuberculosis) ; Brennan v. National Life and Accident Ins. Co., 122 So. 147
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1929) (where applicant was asked: "To what extent do you
now or have you in the past used intoxicants?" His answer of "no" was not
incorrect since he did not drink habitually.).
lRe(overy was also lind in cases controlled by Act 97 of .1908 (repealed by
Act 31 of 1944) which provided that where an insurance policy on life written
without a physical examination the company is presumed to have waived its
rights to a forfeiture of the policy for false answers pertaining to health: Massa-
chusetts Protective Assn. v. Ferguson, 168 La. 271, 121 So. 863 (1929) ; Brown
v. Continental Casualty Co., 161 La. 229, 108 So. 464 (1926) ; Blackwell v.
Fireside Mut. Ins. Co., 11 So.2d 65 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942) ; Langston v. United
States Nat. Life & Casualty Co., 4 La. App. 474 (1st Cir. 1926). See Comment,
The Entire Contract Policy Statute, 16 TuL. L. REv. 270 (1942).
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Louisiana Law Under the Insurance Code
The Louisiana Insurance Code provides that, with the excep-
tion of fire,27 health and accident, and life insurance, no incor-
rect representation or warranty will be deemed material or avoid
any policy unless made with an intent to deceive. 28 The first
sentence of R.S. 22:619 (B) ,'29 the Insurance Code article dealing
specifically with misstatements in life and health and accident
insurance, embodies the Entire Contract Policy Statute declara-
tion that, in the absence of fraud, all statements in the applica-
tion will be deemed representations and not warranties. The last
sentence of this section, which appeared in Louisiana legislation
for the first time in the Insurance Code of 1948, provides:
"The falsity of any such statement shall not bar the right
to recovery under the contract unless such false statement
was made with actual intent to deceive or unless it ma-
terially affected either the acceptance of the risk or the
hazard assumed by the insurer. 3 0 (Emphasis added.)
The natural import of this language is that an incorrect state-
ment will render a contract voidable when it is material, or when
it is made with an intent to deceive. Only the latter alternative
under this interpretation would constitute a deviation from the
traditional rule as an additional means of avoiding insurance
contracts.
In Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co.31 the Louisiana
Supreme Court rendered its first decision interpreting this lan-
guage. The case involved a representation by an insured, who
had been a "blue baby," that he had never been afflicted with a
heart or circulatory disease. The court held that the insurer, in
order to bar recovery, must prove that the applicant's misstate-
ment was material and was made with the intent to deceive. It
was determined that the last sentence of R.S. 22:619 (B) did not
evidence a legislative intention to change the law, but that the
prior jurisprudence had made the intent to deceive a requisite
27. LA. R.S. 22:692 (1950).
28. Id. 22:619(A): "Except as provided in Sub-section B of this Section
and R.S. 22:692, no oral or written misrepresentation or warranty made in the
negotiation of an insurance contract, by the insured or in his behalf, shall be
deemed material or defeat or avoid the contract or prevent it attaching, unless
the misrepresentation or warranty is made with the intent to deceive."
29. Id. 22:619(B).
30. IAid.
31. 233 La.. 226, 96 So.2d 497 (1957).
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to avoidance for misstatement. 82 The court found that the inac-
curate representation was not made with the intent to deceive
since either the insured did not understand the meaning of the
term "blue baby" or did not believe himself to have been one.3 '
One aspect of this decision seems to be unquestionably salu-
tary. In holding that the insurer must prove that the insured's
representation was inaccurate, material, and made with an in-
tent to deceive, the court appears to have abandoned the notion
that an insurance contract may be rescinded for an immaterially
inaccurate representation made with an intent to deceive.3 4 This
would appear to be a sound result, since the purpose of allowing
rescission for a misstatement is to protect the insurance com-
pany and its other policyholders against undesirable risks, not
to punish the dishonest applicant whose dishonesty has caused
no harm. 5
However, the court's interpretation of the prior jurispru-
32. Gay v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co., 233 La. 226, 230, 96 So.2d
497, 498 (1957) : "After the 1906 act, as well as subsequent to the 1916 statute,
this court interpreted such language to mean that incorrect statements in an
application would not vitiate the policy unless they were wilfully made with an
intent to deceive and were material to the risk. Cole v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
N.Y., 129 La. 704, 56 So. 645; Goff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 131 La.98, 59 So. 28; Valesi v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 151 La. 405, 91 So. 818;
Cunningham v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, Pa., 152 La. 1023,95 So. 110; and Carroll v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 168 La. 953, 123 So.
638." Contra Karno v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 137 F. Supp 893,
899 (E.D. La. 1956) : "It is not incumbent on the defendant to prove fraud on
the part of the insured in order to void the policy. The intent of the applicant
or his good faith in making a false statement in an application for life insurance
is not relevant under LSA R.S. 22:619, subd. B, as it is under 22:619, subd.
A, which refers to applications for insurance generally."
33. The court quoted from the assigned reasons of the trial judge, id. at 233,
96 So.2d at 499: "Here the decedent was informed as a small child that he hadbeen a 'blue baby'. But there is no evidence that he had any understanding of
the meaning of the term and . . .such understanding is rare among most laymen.
In addition . . . the decedent reasonably could have doubted and disbelieved whathe had been told about being a 'blue baby'. . . . For the 'blue baby' almost in-
variably dies within the first year . . . , is unable to lead a normal life, has a
. . . bluish color, and is subject to quick and extreme fatigue. But this decedent
lived to reach the age of thirty-seven years . . . did not have a noticeable bluish
color . . . . and . . . engaged in long hours of work driving large trucks between
New Orleans and California."
34. See note 23 supra.
35. Ehrenzweig & Kessler, Misrepresentation and False Warranty in the
Illinois Insurance Code, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 216 (1942) ; PATTERSON, INSUR-
ANcu 367 (1935). The Louisiana Civil Code maintains that the error resulting
from fraud must be on a material part of the contract to render it voidable. LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 1847 (1870). Although it does not purport to govern insurance
contracts, provisions of the Code may nevertheless be applied to commercial trans-
actions where not in conflict with particular legislation. See, e.g., Gordon v.
Unity Life Ins. Co., 215 La. 25, 39 So.2d 812 (1949) ; Oil Well Supply v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 214 La. 772, 38 So.2d 777 (1949) ; Stanley v. Cryer Drill.
Co., 213 La. 980, 36 So.2d 9 (1948) ; Nyman v. Monteleone-Iberville Garage, 211
La. 375, 30 So.2d 123 (1947).
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dence as requiring an intent to deceive in order to avoid an in-
surance policy for a materially incorrect representation seems
questionable.36 In the cases cited for this proposition the court's
scrutiny of the applicant's misstatement for an intent to deceive
seems to have been solely for the purpose of deciding whether
or not the statement was a fraudulent warranty, which would
vitiate the policy without more. Until the Gay case, the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court consistently indicated that the two elements
of inaccuracy and materiality alone in a representation would
constitute grounds for rescission of the insurance contract.3 7
36. A potential source of confusion in analyzing the jurisprudence concerning
misstatements in life and health and accident insurance contracts are the cases
applying La. Acts 1934, No. 160. This statute, which was repealed by the Insur-
ance Code, dealt with policies of industrial life insurance, a term employed to
designate insurance issued by domestic insurers with limited underwriting powers.
See Mataya v. Delta Life Ins. Co., 222 La. 509, 62 So.2d 817 (1953) ; Purvis,
Commentary on Louisiana Insurance Code, in 15 WEST'S LOUISIANA STATUTES
ANNOTATED 1, 26 (1959). The act, as amended by La. Acts 1936, No. 144, and
1938, No. 140, declared that no industrial life insurance policy could be avoided
because of a misstatement unless it wilfully concealed the applicant's ill health.
In applying this statute the courts have required proof of an intent to deceive
for the avoidance of an industrial policy.
Mataya v. Delta Life Ins. Co., 71 So.2d 139 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1954) (fact
that insured did not disclose treatment for cold did not vitiate her good faith) ;
Gongre v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 36 So.2d 71 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948) (wilful
misrepresentation concealing kidney trouble) ; Carter v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co.,
29 So.2d 716 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1947) (wilful misrepresentation concealing
heart trouble) ; Lapeyrouse v. Orleans Industrial Life Ins. Co., 4 So.2d 569 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1941) (insured who thought he was cured was in good faith in
representing that he had no tuberculosis) ; Strudwick Funeral Home v. National
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 176 So. 891 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937) (illiterate Negro
who died of stricture of esophagus was in good faith in failing to disclose sore
throat) ; Pons v. Tharp-Sontheimer Industrial Life & Burial Ins. Co., 173 So. 205(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937) (misrepresentation concealing treatment for syphilis) ;
FoE v. Life Ins. Co., 170 So. 55 (La. App. Or. Cir. 1936) (failure to disclose
medical treatment for persistent bloody urination was wilful misrepresentation).
Cf. Prilleaux v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 4 So.2d 768 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941) ;
Geddes & Moss Undertaking & Embalming Co. v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 177
So. 818 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938), aff'd, 189 La. 891, 181 So. 436 (1938) ;
Succession of Dekan v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 172 So. 37 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1937).
37. In the opinion of Valesi v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 151 La. 405, 407, 91 So.
818, 819 (1922) there is some discussion of whether or not the insured's "repre-
sentation" was fraudulent. Close examination of the case reveals that the
court was concerned with the presence of an intent to deceive in the insured's
statement only for purposes of determining its status as a warranted fact under
Act 52 of 1906: "[G] ranting that deceased was in the habit of using intoxicants
to a greater extent than he indicated when being questioned on the point, the
same would have the effect of a warranty and vitiate the policy only if he
concealed the true fact in such a manner as to amount to a fraud."
The same view is expressed more clearly in a later opinion by the same
Justice: "We conclude, therefore, that, fraud not having been alleged, the
situation is the same as if the defense rested upon the grounds that the answers
were representations, not warranties, and avoided the policy because material
to the risk, and were untrue. Act No. 52 of 1906." Cunningham v. Penn Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 152 La. 1023, 1026, 95 So. 110, 111 (1923).
See Roche v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 La. 168, 94 So.2d 20 (1957)
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rachal, 184 La. 430, 166 So. 129 (1936) ; Carroll v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 168 La. 953, 123 So. 638 (1929).
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Moreover, the rule making proof of an intent to deceive essen-
tial to the insurer's defense in every case involving an incorrect
representation may not be desirable. Since the contract cannot
be avoided for any honest error of the applicant, insurers can-
not rely to a great extent upon his statements in calculating the
risk. Insurance companies must depend more heavily on other
sources of information for the evaluation of risks, such as inde-
pendent investigations and examinations.3s The result of more
careful screening of applicants could mean additional expense to
insurers which might not be entirely offset by a possible con-
sequential decrease in the number of poor risks carried. In
addition, the insurer will less often be able to rescind the con-
tracts that do cover undesirable risks because of the difficulty
of proving fraud.39 It is possible that these factors may operate
ultimately to cause an increase in premium rates in life and
health and accident insurance. Since other kinds of contracts
may be rescinded on the mere showing of material error ° the
decision in the Gay case may reflect a judgment that insurance
contracts are vested with a greater social interest and should be
preserved with greater vigor than other types of contracts.4
This determination would appear to involve a policy considera-
tion of more complexity than is suitable for treatment within
the judicial process.
It is possible that the holding of the Gay case will be restrict-
ed to the proposition that a correct representation of an errone-
ous opinion of health will not avoid the policy. 42 This result
would again leave the meaning of R.S. 22:619(B) in doubt. In
this event, perhaps an examination of other interpretations of
38. Patterson, Misrepresentation by Insured Under the New York Insurance
Law, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 241 (1944): "Even though in most cases further
information is obtained by the insurer from the medical examiner and from an
independent 'inspection' of the risk, the applicant's statements are necessarily
relied upon to some extent with respect to his medical history, family history,
former habits and other matters not readily accessible to the insurer's in-
vestigation."
39. Harnett, Misrepresentations in Life Insurance Applications: An Analysis
of the Kansas Law and a Proposal for Reform, 17 KAN. B.A.J. 214, 225 (1948) :
"[P]roof of fraud is difficult and especially so to an insurer before a jury, pre-
senting a danger to justice; many false claims can succeed under the bad faith
requirement, the result being encouragement of wrongdoing of this sort."
40. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1819, 1823, 1826, 1881 (1870). See CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 613, n. 7 (1960).
41. Compare Harnett, The Doctrine of Concealment: A Remnant in the
Law of Insurance, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROn. 391, 396 (1950).
42. The rule of the Gay case was recognized in Kennison v. United States
Letter Carriers, Mutual Ben. Ass'n, 132 So.2d 94 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), but
the decision for the insured appears to be based on the immaterality of the un-
disclosed physical defect, which was menstrual irregularity. Cf. World Insurance
Co. v. Pipes, 255 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1958).
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similar statutory provisions may prove helpful in future con-
struction of the statute.
Interpretations of similar statutes. In Campbell v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of America43 the Illinois Supreme Court construed a
section 44 of the Illinois Insurance Code containing language
identical to that of R.S. 22:619 (B). In this case the applicant
had made representations regarding his medical history which
were clearly incorrect and material to the risk.45 In deciding for
the insurance company the court held that proof of an actual
intent to deceive was unnecessary to avoid the policy. The
opinion stated that the primary legislative purpose in enacting
the statute was to place all incorrect statements in insurance
applications, whether warranties or representations, on the same
footing 4 6 and that the statute should be read in the disjunctive.
Thus the court indicated that either an innocent but material
misstatement or an immaterial but fraudulent misstatement
would be grounds for avoiding the policy. Other courts constru-
ing similar or identical statutes have negated any requirement
of an intent to deceive in the insured for purposes of avoiding
the policy due to a materially incorrect representation.4 7
Writers have urged that a statutory provision such as R.S.
22:619 (B) should be read to mean that either fraud or material-
ity attending an inaccurate statement may be, but not neces-
sarily is, sufficient to avoid the contract.48 This interpretation
43. 15 Ill.2d 308, 155 N.E.2d.9 (1959), 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 275.
44. ILL. REV. STAT. C. 73, § 766 (1957).
45. The insured represented that he had not had any operation during the
preceding 10 years; that he had never been confined to a hospital and had
never bad an ulcer; that he had not lost any time from work during the preceding
year because of illness, and that he had not been treated by a doctor during the
preceding five years. 15 Ill.2d 308, 309, 155 N.E.2d 9, 10 (1959).
46. It was generally held, in Illinois, before the enactment of the statute
that misrepresentations would avoid a policy only when material, made with
knowledge of their falsity, and with intent to deceive. See Note, 54 Nw. U.L.
REV. 275 (1959).
47. E.g., Tolbert v. Mutual Life & Benefit Insurance Co., 236 N.C. 416, 72
S.E.2d 915 (1952), which held that a material representation which is incorrect
will constitute sufficient ground upon which to avoid the policy under a statute
providing that statements in an application shall be deemed representations and
not warranties, and a representation, unless material or fraudulent, will not
prevent a recovery on the policy. See also Telford v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
9 Cal.2d 103, 69 P.2d 835 (1937), holding that an incorrect representation of
fact, whether intentional or unintentional, which is material to the risk, vitiates
the policy. The presence of-an intention to deceive is not essential.
48. Ehrenzweig & Kessler, Misrepresentation and False Warranty in the
Illinois Insurance Code, 9 U. Ci. L. REV. 209, 214 (1942) ; IHavighurst, Some
Aspects of. the Illinois Insurance Code, 32 ILL. L. REV. 391, 403 (1937);
Prosser, Innocent Misrepresentation of Health in Insurance- Applications, 28
MINN. L. REV. 141, 156 (1944).
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would make fraud or materiality a minimum requisite for avoid-
ance and would not compel the court to rescind the contract in
any case. As a practical matter, this view appears to render in-
effectual such a statute in most jurisdictions. Most courts, left
to their own resources, have required incorrect representations
to be material in order to avoid a policy.49 Apparently, no court
has avoided a contract for an immateriality incorrect represen-
tation even when made with the intent to deceive.50 It would
appear unreasonable to expect courts to initiate such a practice
in the absence of a positive legislative instruction.
The Louisiana Supreme Court appears to be the only tribunal
of several which have considered statutes identical to R.S. 22:619
(B) to find a legislative design to make the intent to deceive a
constant requisite to avoidance of an insurance policy. Several
courts have adopted such a rule independent of legislation or
under other types of statutes.5' However, it appears that in
many cases allowing recovery in spite of an incorrect representa-
tion made in good faith the courts reached the same conclusion
that would have been attained under a correct application of the
traditional rule requiring only inaccuracy and materiality.
52
Individual insurer standard. Under the traditional jurispru-
dential view the insurer was required, in order to prove the ma-
teriality of the insured's representation, to show that a prudent
insurer would not have accepted the risk on the same terms if
he had been availed of a correct representation. 53 Several states
have adopted the individual insurer standard which demands
that the party defending on the insured's incorrect representa-
tion prove that had the statement been accurate the particular
insurer would not have entered the same contract. The ad-
vantage of the subjective standard over the objective one is that
it permits an accurate determination of whether or not the in-
sured improperly gained admission to a group of policyholders
49. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
50. PATTErSON, INSURANCE 433 (2d ed. 1957) ; VANCE, INSURANCE 388 (3d
ed. 1951).
51. See PATTERSON, CASES AND MATEarALS ON INSURANCE 433 (4th ed. 1961).
52. E.g., Heidenreich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 213 Md. 286, 131 A.2d
914 (1957) (recovery allowed because the insured was in good faith in concealing
ulcer; the court expressed doubt as to the materiality of the erroneous representa-
tion) ; Carpenter v. Sun Indem. Co., 138 Neb. 552, 293 N.W. 400 (1940) (insured
was not in bad faith in denying that he had ever had an operation when in
fact he had undergone an operation following a serious attack of osteomyelitis.
He had enjoyed perfect health for a period of 22 years after the operation prior
to the time of the application).
53. Patterson, Misrepresentation by Insured Under the New York Insurance
Law, 44 CoLuIS. L. REV. 241 (1944).
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to which he was not eligible. This is important because of the
variations in the practices of insurance companies with respect
to different types of frailties among insureds.54 Although there
appears to be no Louisiana case in which the issue was contested,
the courts appear to have been in fact using the individual in-
surer standard.55
Conclusion
The insurance contract should not be avoided upon a fraudu-
lent immaterial statement. In all other types of contracts it is
required that the fraud be on a material part of the agreement
in order to rescind. But the insurer should not be restrained
from avoiding the policy where the insured's representation, al-
though innocent, is incorrect and material. Otherwise the in-
surer is able to place little reliance upon the insured's represen-
tation as a description of the risk, and must resort to more ex-
pensive methods to acquire dependable information pertaining
to the risk. It would seem that adequate protection could be af-
forded the interests of both the insurer and the insured by de-
manding that the insurer prove that he, the individual insurer,
would not have made the same contract had the insured's repre-
sentation been correct.
R.S. 22:619 (B) may be read consistently with this view. The
first sentence does not alter the nature of the warranty or the
representation. The warranty is a term of the contract agreed
upon by the parties, and the representation only an inducement
to the contract. This sentence simply operates to give the same
legal effects to a merely false warranty as that produced by the
incorrect representation. The legal effects of the incorrect rep-
resentation and the fraudulent warranty are not altered by this
statute. The last sentence of the statute may be explained as an
attempt to sum up this rule: To vitiate the contract the false
warranty need only be made with an intent to deceive; however,
if it is not made with an intent to deceive it may nevertheless
avoid the contract if it is also material; and the incorrect repre-
sentation need only be material to avoid the contract.66
James L. Dennis
54. Id. at 249.
55. Roche v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 La. 108, 94 So.2d 20 (1957);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rachal, 184 La. 430, 166 So. 129 (1936) ; Cunningham
v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 La. 1023, 95 So. 110 (192) : Lee v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 144 La. 445, 80 So. 652 (1919) ; Goff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 131
La. 98, 59 So. 28 (1912).
56. Perhaps in future legislation consideration should be given the possibility
1961]
